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WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE?
REQUIRING MORE TRANSPARENCY IN
CORPORATE AMERICA: ADVANCEMENTS
IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP FOR
PRIVATELY HELD COMPANIES
DEAN KALANT*
I.

THE NEED FOR CHANGE

Do you remember the last time you went to the DMV?
Besides frustration, what did you bring to prove your identity? A
school ID? Maybe a passport? Perhaps, if you really wanted to
avoid problems you brought an unopened piece of mail with your
name and address on it. Regardless, chances are that you brought
more personal identification materials to obtain a driver's license
than you would need to form a non-publicly held corporation 1 or
limited liability company ("LLC").2

* J.D. Candidate 2010, The John Marshall Law School.
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1. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES &
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES 192 (Thomson West 10th ed. 2007) (1994) (explaining
the characteristics of a corporation). Corporations have a perpetual existence,
meaning they can last forever. Id. Most importantly, owners and managers of
a typical corporation are not personally liable for the corporation's debts. Id.
A corporation can be either private or public. Id. A main difference between a
public and private corporation is that a private corporation's shares are not as
freely transferable as the shares of a publicly held corporation, since they are
not typically listed on a major stock exchange such as the NYSE or NASDAQ.
Id.
2. See id. (detailing the characteristics of an LLC).
LLCs can have
perpetual existence, but sometimes they are limited in duration by state law.
Id. Additionally, LLCs' officers, directors, and owners are usually not liable
for the debts of the LLC. Id. See also Margaret A. Miille, Limited Liability
Companies Get Bad Rap, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Sept. 14, 2008, at 3A (noting that
LLCs have "the tax advantages of partnerships and the limited liability of
corporations"). See also DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY FINANCIAL CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC SHELL COMPANIES IN
FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING: LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 7
(2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news-roomlrp/files/LCAssessment_
FINAL.pdf [hereinafter FINCEN REPORT] (stating that "Rl]ike a corporation
1049
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Surprisingly, a person forming a corporation or LLC within
the United States typically is required to "provide less information
to the state of incorporation than is needed to obtain a bank
account or driver's license." 3 There is a current debate over the
extreme lack of ownership transparency in the United States,
which has been looming over corporate formation for decades. In
response to this dilemma, Senator Carl Levin along with Senators
the
Charles Grassley and Claire McCaskill introduced
Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act
("ITLEA"').4
In assessing this corporate disclosure problem, this Comment
will first discuss the current state of beneficial ownership
disclosure for corporations and LLCs. Second, this Comment will
illustrate the reasons why the ITLEA was proposed. Third, this
Comment will articulate specific provisions of the ITLEA. Fourth,
this Comment will analyze and explain why the current state of
beneficial ownership disclosure is problematic and how the ITLEA
could reduce illicit activity through beneficial owner nondisclosure.
Finally, this Comment will propose recommendations to improve
the ITLEA in order to increase its likelihood of being enacted.

II. WHERE IT ALL WENT WRONG
Currently, "nearly two million corporations and [LLCs]" are
incorporated in the United States each year.5 Although this is a
the LLC structure removes the members and managers from liability"). A
LLC "is considered a 'pass-through' arrangement" because the individual
owners are taxed, rather than the company as a whole. Id. However,
companies can chose to forego individual tax liability and be taxed as a
corporation. Id. A LLC is generally easier to establish than a corporation
since they are subject to fewer procedural requirements. Id.
3. S. 569, 111th Cong. § 2(3) (2009) (as introduced by Sen. Carl Levin,
March 11, 2009).
4. S. 569, § 1. Senator Levin, along with Senator Norm Coleman and
then-Senator Barack Obama, introduced the ITLEA for the first time in May
2008. S.2956, 110th Cong. (2008) (as introduced by Senator Carl Levin, May
1, 2008). However, the ITLEA was re-introduced in March 2009. S. 569.
Currently, it has been referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs for review. Id. This Comment references commentary
from when the ITLEA was first introduced by Senator Levin in May 2008.
However, these authorities are equally relevant to its second introduction in
March 2009 because the bill was essentially left unchanged since its initial
introduction. See id. (reintroducing the same bill as S. 2956, except for the
filing and reporting temporal requirements).
5. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON
AFFAIRS,
LEVIN-COLEMAN-OBAMA
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOV'T

INTRODUCE BILL TO STOP MISUSE OF U.S. COMPANIES (2008), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MinorityNews&Co
[hereinafter
ntentRecord -id-ba56ee34-2503-4f03-92c6-10ebalc968d1
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE]. See also S.569, § 2(1) (noting
that "[n]early 2,000,000 corporations and [LLCs] are being formed under the
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testament to the attractiveness of incorporating within the United
States, states generally allow corporations to form without seeking
the identity of a corporation's beneficial owners. 6 Additionally,
each state has established its own standards of corporation and
LLC beneficial ownership disclosure, further complicating the
problem. A "beneficial owner" is defined as "an individual who has
a level of control over, or entitlement to, the funds or assets of a
corporation or [LLC] that, as a practical matter, enables the
individual, directly or indirectly, to control, manage, or direct the
corporation or [LLC]."7
Presently, the transparency of ownership requirements vastly
differs from state to state. This imbalance makes incorporating in
some states more favorable than in others.8
Despite these
differences, a lack of beneficial ownership transparency is a
common theme for almost every state that allows corporation and
LLC formation. In 2006, the Government Accountability Office
("GAO")9 conducted a study10 and found that no state collected
laws of the States each year.").
6. See S. 569, § 2(2) (explaining that "few States obtain meaningful
information about the beneficial owners of the corporations and LLCS formed
under their laws.").
7. S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(e)(1).
8. See FINCEN REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-9 (showing the many different
levels of transparency used among individual states).
9. See United States Government Accountability Office, COMPANY
FORMATION:

MINIMAL

OWNERSHIP

INFORMATION

IS

COLLECTED

AND

AVAILABLE 3 (2006), available at http://www.iaca.org/downloads/BOS/GAO/GA
OBRIEFINGSLIDES.pdf [hereinafter GAO STUDY] (explaining that the
"GAO is an independent agency in the legislative branch of the federal
government."). The Comptroller General, who is appointed by the President,
heads the GAO for a fifteen-year term. Id. The "GAO supports congressional
oversight through audits, investigations, program evaluations, policy analyses,
and legal decisions." Id.
10. See id. at 4 (explaining why the GAO conducted the study). The Senate
Permanent Subcommittee of Investigations ("PSI") requested that the GAO
"conduct a review of all states on the extent to which they collect and verify
beneficial ownership information on non-publicly traded companies ....
Id.
Additionally, the PSI requested that the GAO determine what information
formation agents should collect and verify. Id. The scope of the 2006 study
was "to determine what kind of company information is collected by states to
provide some context for understanding the extent to which ownership
information is collected for company formations." Id. at 5. The study
"[flocused on corporations because they have been the dominant business form
and [LLCs] because they are growing in popularity." Id. Furthermore, to gain
all necessary information, the GAO surveyed officials from all fifty states and
specifically met with state officials from Delaware, Florida, Nevada, Arizona
and Oregon. Id. at 8. The study also reviewed state statutes, forms from state
websites, and "[i]nterviewed academics, companies that provide filing and
related services for businesses, law firms, and financial institutions." Id. See
also Financial Action Task Force, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM:
UNITED

STATES

OF

AMERICA

2

(2006),

available at

http://www.fatf-
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beneficial ownership information for corporations, while only four
states collected minimal information on LLCs. 11 Further, the
study found that less than half of states collected information
about management, directors, or officers of corporations on
formation documents. 12
Similarly, although "[miost states
collected information on corporate officers and directors and
managers of LLCs on periodic reports," these reports did not verify
information concerning beneficial owners. 13 Further, the GAO
study found that "formation agents" 14 were not required to collect
ownership information or verify the information of clients who
formed corporations or LLCs.15 Moreover, the study found that
6
some states even allow corporate formation over the internet.
7
Numerous law enforcement problems have resulted from
gafi.org/dataoecd/44/12/37101706.pdf [hereinafter FATF U.S. REPORT] (adding
that the FATF, the leading international organization combating money
laundering and other illicit activity of corporations and LLCs, conducted a
similar study and likewise found that the United States was deficient in
obtaining ownership information).
11. GAO STUDY, supra note 9, at 9.
12. Id.
13. Id.
See also Leroy Baker, Senate Bill Proposes Tougher Company
Disclosure Laws, TAX-NEWS.COM
(May 27,
2008),
http://www.taxnews.com/asp/story/story-print.asp?storyname=31110 (noting that "[t]he GAO
report reviewed the legal requirements in all 50 states to set up corporations
and LLCS"). The study "found that most states failed to request beneficial
ownership information, and reported that the absence of this ownership
information impeded law enforcement investigations of suspect corporations."
Id.
14. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(e)(3)(defining formation agents as "individuals
who act on behalf of another person to assist in the formation of a
corporation.").
15. See GAO STUDY, supra note 9, at 10 (stating that formation agents
"collect the information that states require; therefore, most do not collect
ownership information.").
16. See Senator Carl Levin, Statement Introducing the Incorporation
Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act 3 (May 1, 2008), available
at
http://www.iaca.org/downloads/2008Conference/BOS/Levin-flr.-stmt.pdf
[hereinafter Levin Introduces Bill] (noting that the GAO study also found that
many states have established automated procedures for company formation).
Automated procedures allow an individual "to form a new corporation or LLC
in the state within 24 hours of filing an online application without any prior
review of that application by a State official." Id. Furthermore, "[i]n exchange
for a substantial fee, two States will even form a corporation or LLC within
one hour of a request."
Id.
Also, in some instances, states advertise
automated procedures and even highlight nondisclosure of ownership
information. Id.
17. See S. 569, § 2(5) (stating that "[1]aw enforcement efforts to investigate
corporations and [LLCs] suspected of committing crimes have been impeded
by the lack of available beneficial ownership information."). For example, in
Nevada, the lack of beneficial ownership information impedes criminal
investigations since there is a significant 'lag time of up to two months from
the date an LLC organizes and the date its initial list of managers" and
owners is due. Miillee, supra note 2. In fact, sometimes the list never even
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states' failure to monitor corporate formation effectively.
Criminals exploit the states' lack of beneficial ownership
requirements by concealing their identities when forming
corporations or LLCs, allowing them to illegally launder money
Moreover,
and assets from these corporations and LLCs.18
problems arise when criminals establish companies in the form of
"shell corporations" because the shell corporations formational and
operational requirements actually facilitate criminals' ability to
manipulate corporate conduct for illegal activity. 19 Regardless,
whether an entity is classified as a shell corporation or not, states
individually, and the legislature as a whole, have not been
responsive to this issue. 20 Therefore, criminals are able to use
these corporations and LLCs "to commit crimes affecting

materializes. Id.
See Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 1
18. S. 569, § 2(4).
(commenting that law enforcement authorities investigating these crimes have
complained heavily about the lack of beneficial ownership information made
Senator Levin went on to say that "in countless
available to them).
investigations" where criminals utilize corporations and LLCs, law
enforcement officials' inability to gain "access to true beneficial ownership
information slows, confuses or impedes the efforts by investigators to follow
criminal proceeds." Id. "This is the case in financial fraud, terrorist financing
and money laundering investigations." Id. For example, the IRS recently
pursued three individuals who developed multiple United States companies.
SUBCOMMI1T"EE ON INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE, supra note 5. By using these
companies, the criminals were able to conceal nine million dollars in taxable
income to foreign countries. Id. Similarly, with the use of foreign owned
companies, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") found that
Russian officials used these companies in Pennsylvania and Delaware to
divert more than fifteen million dollars back to Russia, intending to upgrade
former Soviet Union nuclear power plant facilities. Id.
19. See FINCEN REPORT, supra note 2, at 2 (defining shell corporations).
Shell corporations refer to non-publicly traded corporations, LLCs, and trusts
that have no physical presence or major assets. Id. at 2-4. They typically
have no more than a mailing address and generally have no employees or
economic value. Id. at 4. "Most shell companies are formed by individuals and
businesses for legitimate purposes, such as to hold stock or intangible assets of
another business entity or to facilitate domestic and cross-border currency and
asset transfers and corporate mergers." Department of the Treasury Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network, Potential Money Laundering Risks Related to
Shell Companies (2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes-regs/
[hereinafter Shell Company
guidance/htmllAdvisoryOnShells_FINAL.html
Article]. "Lack of transparency in the formation and operation of shell
companies may be a desired characteristic for certain legitimate business
activity, but it is also a vulnerability that allows these companies to disguise
their ownership and purpose." Id.
20. See Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 4 (concluding that the
proposal from The National Association of Secretaries of State was deficient);
see also John G. Edwards, Bill Would Put Limits on Secrecy, LAS VEGAS REV.
J., May 2, 2008, available at http://www.lvrj.com/business/18481494.html
[hereinafter Limits on Secrecy] (noting that some critics have not found
Nevada's new ownership disclosure law effective).
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interstate and international commerce, such as terrorism, drug
trafficking, money laundering, tax evasion, securities fraud,
financial fraud, and acts of foreign corruption." 21 In response, the
22
ITLEA seeks to remedy these issues.

III. THE PROPOSED IMPROVEMENT
The ITLEA's purpose is to ensure that owners and formation
agents 23 who form non-publicly held 24 companies in the United
States disclose the beneficial owners of those companies. This
disclosure
requirement
would
prevent
criminals
from
incorporating in the United States for illicit gain. 25 Further, the

21. S. 569, § 2(4). See also John G. Edwards, Registered Agents Fight Bill
Requiring Corporate Ownership Records, LAS VEGAS REV. J., May 3, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 8389953 [hereinafter Registered Agents] (explaining
that while not all corporations and LLCs are created for illegitimate reasons,
lack of beneficial owner transparency has caused numerous problems relating
to money laundering, tax evasion, terrorism, and other misconduct).
For
example, a privately held Nevada corporation received thousands of suspicious
wire money transfers totaling millions of dollars over just a couple of years.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE, supra note 5. Law enforcement
agents were unable, however, to identify the corporation's beneficial owners;
as a result, the corporation's owners were never prosecuted. Id.
22. See Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 1 (quoting the U.S.
Department of Treasury) (stating that "the lack of transparency with respect
to the individuals who control privately held for-profit legal entities created in
the United States continues to represent a substantial vulnerability.").
Additionally, Senator Levin stated that "[t]he use of U.S. companies to mask
the identity of criminals presents an ongoing and substantial problem ... for
U.S. and global law enforcement authorities." Id.
23. See Bruce Zagaris, American Bar Association Adopts Resolution
Opposing Bills on Company Formation and Tax Havens, 24 INT'L.
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 10, 2 (2008) (defining the formation agents as parties
that assist in forming business entities). The ITLEA will subject formation
agents to various requirements, "such as an internal compliance plan,
training, and independent audit." Id. Also, the ITLEA will give the Treasury
Department authority "to impose suspicious activity reporting requirements"
on these agents. Id.
24. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(e)(2)(B) (stating that the ITLEA does not
apply to any issuers of securities). The ITLEA provides exemptions for certain
corporations, including publicly traded corporations and the corporations and
LLCs they form. Id. This is because the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") already oversees publicly traded companies. Press Release, Carl
Levin, United States Senator, Summary of Incorporation Transparency and
Law
Enforcement Assistance Act
(May
1,
2008),
available at
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=297089 [hereinafter Senator
Levin Statement]. Further, the ITLEA may not apply to certain corporations
and LLCs where the state and Homeland Security and Justice Departments
determine appropriate because requiring these sorts of corporations to provide
beneficial ownership information "would not serve the public interest or assist
law enforcement." Id.
25. See generally S. 569 (stating the purpose underlying the introduction of
the bill).
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ITLEA aims at assisting law enforcement agencies in detecting,
preventing, and punishing misconduct involving United States
corporations. 26 The ITLEA proposes an amendment that would be
added at the end of the Homeland Security Act 27 by applying,
among other things, the ITLEA to both domestic and foreign
owned corporations.
In addition, the amendment includes
penalties resulting from a state's noncompliance with the ITLEA,
provisions for funding and state conformity with the ITLEA, as
well as additional rules and studies that will follow the ITLEA's
28
enactment by Congress.
A. Domestically Owned Corporations
The ITLEA would require each state that receives funding
from the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") to use an
incorporation system that meets specific criteria in incorporating
domestic corporations by no later than the beginning of 2012.29
These requirements would mandate each applicant forming a
corporation or LLC to disclose a full list of the company's beneficial
owners. 30 The list must identify all owners by name and provide
their current address. 31 Further, if a corporation is a beneficial
owner of the forming corporation or LLC, all ownership of the
controlling company must also be disclosed. 32 The ITLEA requires
this information to remain up-to-date.33 The ITLEA calls for each
domestically owned corporation or LLC to update the list of
beneficial owners depending on the filing requirements of the
particular state of incorporation. 34 This information would be
maintained by the state until "the end of the 5-year period
beginning on the date that the corporation or [LLC] terminates
35
under the laws of the State."

26. Id.
27. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
28. S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a); Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24.
29. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1) (requiring that each applicant provide a list of
the beneficial owners of the corporation or LLC during formation under the
laws of the United States); see also Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24
(giving states until Fall 2011 "to require beneficial ownership information for
the corporations and LLCs").
30. S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(A).
31. S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(A)(i); Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24.
32. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(A)(ii) (providing that "if any beneficial owner
exercises control over the corporation or LLC through another legal entity," he
must identify each legal entity and each "beneficial owner who will use that
entity to exercise control over the corporation or LLC.").
33. S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(B); Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24.
34. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(B) (explaining that beneficial ownership
information will be required to be updated in an annual filing with the state,
or if no annual filing is required, each time there is a modification in beneficial
ownership).
35. S.569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(C).
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Finally, the ITLEA addresses how and to whom the
ownership information would be provided. It requires a state to
make company beneficial ownership information available to a law
enforcement agency upon receipt of a subpoena. 36 Further, the
ITLEA makes ownership information regarding foreign countries
available to agencies upon formal request. 37 The ITLEA would not
require ownership information to be passed to the public for non38
law enforcement related matters.
B. Foreign-Owned Corporations
The requirements of disclosure of foreign held corporations
mirror those of domestically owned corporations. 39 But the ITLEA
would impose an additional requirement on foreign owners by

36. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(D) (specifying that ownership information will
be provided "upon receipt of a civil or criminal subpoena or summons from a
State agency, Federal agency, or congressional committee or subcommittee
requesting such information").
37. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(D)(ii) (stating that ownership information will
be provided upon a "written request made by a Federal agency on behalf of
another country under an international treaty, . . . or section 1782 of title 28,
United States Code."); see also Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24
(requiring that states obtain a list of the beneficial owners of each corporation
or LLC formed under their laws).
This is in an effort to aid foreign
jurisdictions, ensure the information is updated annually, and to make
information available to civil or criminal law enforcement agencies, upon
receipt of a subpoena or summons. Id.
38. See Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 5 (articulating that the
ITLEA does not require public disclosure, allowing states to determine
individually). The ITLEA does not "supersede, alter, or affect any statute,
regulation, order, or interpretation in effect in any State, except where a State
... receive[s] funding from the Department of Homeland Security under
section 2004 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ...... S. 569, § 3(b)(1).
Even where the state does receive funding, the only change will be the extent
that the "[s]tate statue, regulation, order, or interpretation is not inconsistent"
with the ITLEA. S. 569, § 3(b)(2). Further, a state statute, regulation, order,
or interpretation is not affected by the ITLEA when it "requires additional
information, more frequently updated information, or additional measures to
verify information" from a corporation, LLC, or beneficial owner. S. 569,
§ 3(b)(2)(A). Similarly, the ITLEA will not affect state law if the state imposes
additional limits on public access to the beneficial ownership information
obtained by the State. S. 569, § 3(b)(2)(B).
39. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(2) (explaining that states must meet disclosure
requirements for foreign beneficial owners no "later than the beginning of
fiscal year 2012," as is required of domestic corporations and LLCs). Further,
"the name, address, and identity of each beneficial owner that is not a United
States citizen or a lawful permanent resident of the United States" must be
verified.
S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(2)(A).
Also, this information, like those of
domestically held companies, is only available upon request by a law
enforcement agency. S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(2)(C). Additionally, this information
will be retained "until the end of the five-year period beginning on the date
that the corporation or [LLC] terminates under the laws of the State," just like
in domestic corporations. S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(2)(D).
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requiring each foreign application of incorporation to be certified
by a formation agent before the state accepts the corporation or
LLC.40 This certification, among other things, requires that the
formation agent obtain a photocopy of the page of the governmentissued passport on which a photograph of the beneficial owner
41
appears.
C. Penalties,Funding, and Compliance with the ITLEA
The ITLEA would also attach penalties against individuals
and entities for noncompliance. In addition to any civil or criminal
penalty that may be imposed by a state, any individual or
company who fabricates beneficial ownership information may be
further liable to the state. 42 These additional penalties can be in
43
the form of civil or criminal liability.
The ITLEA acknowledges that its enactment would demand
additional resources from states to achieve compliance.
To
state
to
use
all
or
a
portion
address this, the ITLEA would allow a
of the funds it currently receives from the DHS to comply with the
ITLEA. 44 Moreover, the ITLEA outlines procedures a state may
use to receive additional funding to implement additions or
modifications to the ITLEA. 45 In addition, the ITLEA does not
40. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(2) (requiring that each application and each
update of beneficial owner information "shall include a written certification by
a formation agent residing in the State"); see also Senator Levin Statement,
supra note 24 (reiterating that corporations and LLCs with non-U.S. beneficial
owners must provide certification from an in-state formation agent who has
verified the owner's identity); SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE,
supra note 5 (summarizing the effect of the ITLEA on non-U.S. beneficial
owners).
41. S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(2)(B).
42. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(b) (penalizing an individual when he/she knowingly
provides, or attempts to provide, false information to the state, intentionally
fails to provide information upon request, or fails to provide his/her updated
information).
43. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(b)(1),(2) (stating that an individual who violates the
ITLEA shall be 'liable to the United States ...of not more than $10,000; and
may be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than
3 years, or both."); see also Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24 (outlining
how the ITLEA establishes "civil and criminal penalties under federal law for
persons who knowingly provide false beneficial ownership information or
intentionally fail to provide required beneficial ownership information to a
State.").
44. S.569, § 3(a)(1)(c); Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24.
45. See S. 569, § 3 (noting that "the Administrator may use funds
appropriated to carry out this title, including unobligated or reprogrammed
funds."). The ITLEA allows this to enable a state to fully obtain and manage
beneficial ownership information for the corporations and LLCs. Id. Funding
allows states to "assess, plan, develop, test, or implement relevant policies,
procedures, or system modifications." Id.; see also Senator Levin Statement,
supra note 24 (allowing states to use an existing DHS grant program and
authorizing DHS to use already appropriated funds to meet the requirements
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authorize the withholding of funds from a state for failing to
comply with its ownership requirements. 46 Instead, a report
would be conducted to identify states that are still not compliant
by June 1, 2013.47 States not in compliance would then be advised
48
on how to achieve compliance.
D. Specific Anti-Money LaunderingProvisionand GAO Study
The ITLEA includes a specific provision to be added to the
end of the Homeland Security Act of 200249 that specifically
addresses money laundering. The ITLEA would require that a
"proposed rule" be implemented within a month and a half after
enactment of the ITLEA, addressing anti-money laundering
programs. 50 This "proposed rule" would then be formulated into a
51
"final rule" within nine months after the ITLEA's enactment.
In addition to the "final rule," the ITLEA would require a
GAO study to be conducted within one year after the ITLEA's
enactment. 52 The study would first identify states that allow
companies to form within it and then identify which of those states
have been compliant with the ITLEA. 53 Noncompliant states
of the ITLEA).
46. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(d) (explaining that nothing in the ITLEA
authorizes any state's funding to be withheld because of noncompliance with
the ITLEA).
47. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(d) (explaining that the Comptroller General shall
be in charge of submitting the report). The report will be given to the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and
the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives. S. 569,
§ 3(a)(1)(d); Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24.
48. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(d) (detailing that states not in compliance by June
1, 2013, shall be reported and will be advised how to achieve compliance).
49. 6 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
50. See S. 569, § 4(b)(1) (stating "not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of [the ITLEA]," the Secretary of the Treasury shall publish a rule
in the Federal Register establishing anti-money laundering programs).
51. See S. 569, § 4(b)(2) (elaborating that "not later than 270 days after the
date of enactment of [the ITLEA], the Secretary of the Treasury shall publish
the rule described in this subsection in final form in the Federal Register.");
see also Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24 ("requiring the Treasury
Secretary to issue a rule requiring formation agents to establish anti-money
laundering programs to ensure they are not forming U.S. corporations ... for
criminals").
52. See S. 569, § 5 (stating that the Comptroller General of the United
States will conduct the study).
53. See S. 569, § 5(1) (explaining that the study would identify each state
that enables formation of "partnerships, trusts, or other legal entities.").
Further, the study would scrutinize each state that requires persons seeking
to form these corporations or LLCs under the laws of the state to provide
information about the beneficial owners or beneficiaries of such entities, and
the nature of the required information. S. 569, § 5(1). See also Senator Levin
Statement, supra note 24 (requiring the GAO to complete a study of state
beneficial ownership information requirements for state entities).
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would then be analyzed to determine if their noncooperation
resulted in illegal corporate activity and impaired law enforcement
Last, the study would evaluate
agencies' investigations.5 4
international perception of the ITLEA's progress and, if necessary,
pinpoint further action needed to respond to the problems that
have been created due to the nondisclosure of beneficial
ownership. 55
IV. OLD VERSUS NEW
First, this section will analyze the interaction that the ITLEA
would have with current requirements of beneficial ownership
Second, this section will analyze states' and
disclosure.
legislature's initiatives in addressing disclosure issues thus far.
Last, this section will specifically examine the ITLEA's
relationship with shell corporations.
A. The Problem This Poses to the United States
The current undemanding requirements of beneficial
ownership disclosure throughout individual state allow criminals
to engage in terrorism, money laundering, and other misconduct
through the use of corporations and LLCs. Each state is unique in
requiring different levels of ownership disclosure, some requiring
higher scrutiny than others. 56 Law enforcement officials have
54. See S. 569, § 5(3)(B) (evaluating the lack of available beneficial
ownership information for legal entities). The study will determine if a lack of
beneficial ownership information "raises concerns about the involvement of
such entities in terrorism, money laundering, tax evasion, securities fraud, or
other misconduct." S. 569, § 5(3)(A).
55. See S. 569, § 3 (stating that the GAO study will determine whether the
ITLEA's progress has "elicited international criticism and what steps, if any,
the United States has taken or is planning to take in response."). The United
States is cognizant of international perception as it is well behind
FATF U.S.
international standards of beneficial ownership disclosure.
REPORT, supra note 10, at 9. Currently, many foreign countries are already
required to identify the beneficial owners of the corporations they form. S.
See also Lynne Byles, CIFA Acknowledges US Senator's
569, § 2(10).
Comments on Higher Regulation of Cayman Island Corporations,MASS MEDIA
DISTRIBUTION NEWSWIRE (May 23, 2008), available at http://www.mmdnews
wire.comcifsa-acknowledges-us-senators-comments-on-higher-regulatin-ofcayman-islands-companies-3409.html (stating that these standards have been
implemented in the Cayman Islands for years); SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE, supra note 5 (explaining that "[a]ll 27 countries in
the European Union are already required to obtain beneficial ownership
information for the corporations they form"); Levin Introduces Bill, supra note
16, at 4 (criticizing the fact that United States law enforcement officials often
have had to "stand silent" when asked by their international counterparts
about who owns a United States corporation being investigated for committing
crimes in their jurisdictions). The U.S. officials cannot answer the inquiries
simply because they do not have the information. Id.
56. See FINCEN REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that states that do not

1060

The John MarshallLaw Review

[42:1049

emphasized that the current lack of beneficial ownership
information from states impairs and, in some instances,
completely stops criminal investigations.5 7
This lack of
information is so common that recent reports have emphasized
concerns over the difficulty in acquiring accurate beneficial
58
ownership information.
Enactment of the ITLEA would operate as a remedy by
allowing enforcement officials to gain the information they need.
This is information that both states and formations agents have
failed to require in the past. 59 Under the influence of the ITLEA,
past illicit activity would be substantially abridged. For example,
under the current standards of beneficial ownership transparency,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") reported that a
privately held Nevada corporation received thousands of
suspicious wire transfers totaling millions of dollars over just two
years. 60 While law enforcement agents were quick to respond to
the blatant illicit activity, their investigation was completely
halted because they were unable to identify the corporation's
beneficial owners. 6 1 The case was never prosecuted, and the
criminals behind the corporation were never charged.6 2 The GAO
conducted a similar investigation and found that an individual
was able to set up two thousand different Delaware companies and

require companies to report identities of beneficial owners are the most
attractive to those seeking to use the companies for illicit gain). Fourteen
states impose no requirement on companies to report the identities of owners
or managers. Id. Eight states require companies to report the identities of
managers only, with no requirement of disclosing the owners. Id. Twentyfour states, including Illinois, require a company to report the identities of the
owners but only when the company lacks identified managers. Id. Therefore,
forty-seven jurisdictions in the United States exist where companies may
legally remain unreported. Id.
57. Baker, supra note 13. See also Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 1
(explaining that the lack of ownership information "slows, confuses or
impedes" enforcement investigations).
58. Baker, supra note 13.
59. See id. (emphasizing that law enforcement officials need the names of
the true owners of a corporation in order to determine who is responsible for
illegal activity, but law enforcement cannot acquire those names when the
states do not ask companies for this information); Levin Introduces Bill, supra
note 16, at 1 (addressing complaints received by law enforcement agents about
states' lack of beneficial ownership information).
60. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE, supra note 5
(explaning that a Nevada-based company received more than 3,700 wire
transfers totaling eighty-one million dollars); see also Baker, supra note 13
(stating that ITLEA supporters complained that the lack of corporate
ownership records in Nevada blocked their investigation).
61. Baker, supra note 13; SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE,
supra note 5.
62. Baker, supra note 13; SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE,
supra note 5.
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establish bank accounts for each. 63 Again, law enforcement's
pursuit of this matter was impaired by the lack of available
beneficial ownership information. These two examples are a mere
sample of a plethora of other instances where corporations and
6
LLCs are being used for illegal gain. 4
Under the ITLEA, criminal investigations would no longer be
impeded or impaired, 65 since section three of the Act requires the
application of equal disclosure laws to all states.66 The ITLEA
would give law enforcement agencies the name and specific
67
address of each beneficial owner of a privately held company.
Therefore, the disparity and confusion of ownership requirements
between states would cease. As a result, every state would enjoy
increased corporation and LLC formation and stimulate local
economies by offering companies clear and consistent disclosure
68
standards.
Additionally, the ITLEA would safeguard against illegal
63. SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE, supra note 5. Without
revealing his identity, he was able to move billions of dollars through these
bank accounts and companies for personal gain. Id.
64. See Baker, supra note 13 (stating that there are numerous examples of
law enforcement problems relating to beneficial owner transparency). The
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network found that between 1996 and 2004,
financial institutions filed 397 suspicious activity reports, which involved
billions of dollars. Id.
"Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") reported that United States companies are being used to launder
roughly $36 billion from the former Soviet Union." Id. The FBI also stated
that it currently has approximately 103 open cases investigating manipulation
of privately held United States corporations. Id.
65. See GAO STUDY, supra note 9, at 12 (identifying a case where company
disclosure documents helped facilitate a law enforcement investigation). In
Michigan, the IRS tracked down four criminals who formed fifteen
corporations in Michigan and Indiana. Id. Through these companies, the
criminals were able to obtain lines of credit from a bank to purchase luxury
items that eventually cost the bank a loss of more than nine million dollars.
Id. The IRS, through the use of ownership information required by the states
where the fifteen companies were formed, was able to find key pieces of
evidence necessary to prosecute the criminals. Id.
66. S. 569 § 3(a)(1)(a).
67. S. 569 § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(A)(i); Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24.
68. See FINCEN REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (explaining that states with
more transparency have shown higher growth on average than those with less
transparency; states that require "the greatest level of transparency averaged
an increase of 138.75%" of company formation between 2001 and 2005).
Requiring companies to report more information on beneficial owners would
not negatively affect the number of companies formed within a particular
state. Id. Thus, the vulnerabilities of the states which require less ownership
disclosure could be reduced through requiring more disclosure without a major
adverse affect on the state's revenue. Id. Also, the benefits realized by law
enforcement agencies through readily available ownership information "could
prove significant." Id. See also Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 5
(emphasizing that federal legislation is needed to level the playing field among
the states and set a minimum standard for obtaining ownership information).
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activity through beneficial owner nondisclosure by making
ownership information available to the government for up to five
years after a corporation or LLC stops operating. 69 This would
allow law enforcement agencies to acquire information needed to
70
investigate parties, even if a dispute arises years later.
B. Improvements That Are a Long Time Coming
The United States is generally perceived by the rest of the
world as a leader in free trade and prosperity. The ITLEA would
ensure that the United States' leadership role continues into the
future by bringing beneficial ownership disclosure requirements
up to par with the rest of the world. Outside of the ITLEA, both
Congress and individual states have proposed faulty and
ineffective initiatives to improve the current system of beneficial
ownership disclosure.7 1 In July 2006, the Financial Action Task
Force ("FATF')72 criticized the United States for surprisingly being
one of the only countries that fails to require beneficial ownership
information.7 3 The FATF urged the United States to remedy its
lack of disclosure regulations, but the United States failed to
74
respond to these requests as well.
Some states, such as Nevada, have criticized the ITLEA and

69. S.569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(C).
70. See id. (requiring states to hold beneficial ownership information for
five years after a corporation or LLC ceases its operation). This applies
equally to all domestically owned and foreign-owned entities. Id.
71. See RegisteredAgents, supra note 21 (providing that a new law initiated
solely by the state of Nevada allows law enforcement officers to request
ownership records for the state's corporations and LLCs). If the corporation or
LLC does not respond to the request, "the Secretary of State's office can revoke
its charter and dissolve the corporation." Miille, supra note 2. However, the
Secretary of State of Nevada Mr. Ross Miller "acknowledged that a fraudulent
corporation might [still] fail to respond to a request for ownership records"
under the Nevada law. Limits on Secrecy, supra note 20. See also Miille,
supra note 2 (noting that Nevada officials believe the Nevada law
inadequately addresses beneficial ownership problems). The Nevada law
cannot remedy the problem because it still leaves actual ownership
undiscovered. Id. Essentially, the law would revoke the company's charter
but would fail to reveal who was controlling the illicit company in the first

place. Id.
72. See FATF U.S. REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 (reiterating that the FATF
is the leading international organization combating money laundering and
other illicit activities of corporations and LLCs). Requiring more beneficial
ownership information is "one of 40 FATF standards that this country has
publicly committed itself to implementing." Levin Introduces Bill, supra note
16, at 2.
73. See Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 3 (stating that during the
2006 FATF evaluation, the United States was criticized for failing to comply
with FAFF requirements).
74. See id. at 3 (emphasizing that the United States has "yet to make any
real progress" in requiring more beneficial ownership information).
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disagree with Senator Levin.7 5 Nevada State legislators argue
that beneficial ownership transparency has not posed a significant
problem and that states have in fact been responsive to issues that
have arisen.7 6 The FATF did acknowledge that the United States
currently possesses a range of investigatory powers to compel the
disclosure of beneficial ownership information.7 7 But he FATF
also noted that the system is only as good as the information that
is available, 78 and in the context of beneficial ownership, this is
close to nothing.7 9 The ITLEA and its amendments to the
Homeland Security Act 8 0 would bring the United States up to the
FATF's standards, while simultaneously easing critics' 81 and
corporations' fear of too much transparency in the corporate
82
marketplace.
Also, the meager efforts by the legislature to remedy the issue
thus far have been to no avail. The National Association of
Secretaries of State ("NASS") created a 2007 task force to find a
solution to beneficial ownership disclosure problems.8 3 At the
request of NASS, Senator Levin agreed to postpone the
introduction of the ITLEA while NASS worked on a proposal "to
require the collection of beneficial ownership information. 8 4 The

75. Limits on Secrecy, supra note 20.

76. John G. Edwards, Nevada Officials See Millions of Lost Dollars with
Proposed Disclosure Bill, LAS VEGAS REV. J., June 19, 2009, available at
http://www.lvrj.com/business/48598602.html.
See also John G. Edwards,
Transparency Bill Draws Mixed Reactions, LAS VEGAS REV. J, May 3, 2008,
available at
http://www.lvrj.com/business/18544189.html
[hereinafter
Transparency Bill] (stating that "Senator Levin is introducing this bill as
though the states have been completely unresponsive, and that simply isn't
the case.").
77. FATF U.S. REPORT, supra note 10, at 236.
78. Id.
79. See id. (stating that information concerning companies and LLCs whose
shares are not listed on the major exchanges are often minimal regarding
beneficial ownership information). Reporting requirements are such that the
necessary information is often not "adequate, accurate or available on a timely
basis." Id. at 9. "This is a vulnerability for the U.S." Id.
80. 6 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
81. See Transparency Bill, supra note 76 (stating that opponents of the
ITLEA have criticized the bill, calling it an "unnecessary government
intrusion into the investments of businesspeople who are legitimate.").
82. See Levin IntroducesBill, supra note 16, at 6 (clarifying that the ITLEA
does not require states to make beneficial ownership information available to
the public). Therefore, the ITLEA counters critics' presumptions that it would
expose companies' classified information to the public. Rather, the bill leaves
the choice to make information available up to the particular state. Id. See
also Miille, supra note 2 (noting that states could keep the owners' names
anonymous from the general public; "state officials would [only] be only
required to provide records in response to a law enforcement agency's
subpoena or summons.").
83. Levin IntroducesBill, supra note 16, at 4.
84. Id. Levin and his staff suggested provisions and comments to NASS,
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NASS proposal, however, was full of deficiencies and would not
have remedied the current problems facing corporation and LLC
ownership disclosure.8 5 For example, the proposal only required
states to collect a record of a company's owners, which is usually
incomplete and outdated.8 6
The NASS proposal's failure to
explicitly require that the information for each corporation or LLC
be updated would render a great deal of ownership information
inaccurate.8 7 Therefore, the NASS proposal would not thoroughly
address beneficial ownership problems, allowing criminals to
continue to illegally manipulate the system.88 Thus, the response
from Congress, like that of individual states, has not been
sufficient in addressing the issue.
In June 2009, NASS once again requested postponement of
the ITLEA's consideration.8 9 In a hearing before the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 90 North
Carolina Secretary of State and NASS Co-Chair Elaine F.
Marshall explained that a new model law9' on company formation
but their efforts were to no avail. Id. Around July 2007, the U.S. Department
of Treasury sent NASS a letter, notifying them that the NASS proposal did not
fully address the problems in beneficial owner transparency. Id.
85. See Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 4 (quoting the U.S. Dept. of
Treasury's statement that "the NASS proposal 'falls short' and does not fully
address the problem of legal entities masking the identity of criminals."). The
NASS proposal made states unaccountable because it did not require the
states themselves to maintain and produce the ownership information upon a
law enforcement agency's request. Id. Also, ownership information under this
proposal would not always be accurate since it did not specify that the
information needs to be updated. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Criminals could have continued to manipulate corporations and LLCs
under the NASS proposal. They would not update their company's beneficial
owners through the years, which would create just as much confusion for law
enforcement agents as before. Under Section three of the ITLEA, however,
beneficial owners are required to disclose themselves in annual filings or
whenever any change in beneficial ownership occurs. S. 569, § 3.
89. Elaine F. Marshall, North Carolina Secretary of State, Co-Chair, NASS,
Testimony Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Comm.: Examining State Business IncorporationPractices:A Discussion of the
Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act 3 (June 18,
2009),
available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction
=Hearings.Hearing&HearingID=efl0e25-2cld-4344-bafl-07f606161 lc1
[hereinafter Testimony from Elaine F. Marshall].
90. Examining State Business IncorporationPractices:A Discussion of the
Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act: Hearing on
S. 569 Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Comm.,
111th
Cong.
(2009),
available
at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&HearingID=efl0e125-2cld-4344bafl-07f6061611cl; Today on the Hill, THE WASH. POST (June 18, 2009),
available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitol-briefing2009/06/today_
onthe_hill_98.html.
91. Testimony from Elaine F. Marshall,supra note 89, at 3. The new UCL
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would be completed, with the help of NASS, by the Uniform Law
Commission 92 ("UCL") in July 2009. 93 Secretary of State Marshall
is opposed to the ITLEA and argues that the UCL's Act should be
considered in place of the ITLEA. 94 But even though "[NASS]
ha[s] worked with [UCL] since they began their drafting in 2007"
on the Uniform Act,95 these efforts should not stop the ITLEA from
being enacted now. The last two years have seen too much
wrangling over speculative legislation. Enacting the ITLEA now
would undoubtedly guarantee that the United States complied
with FATF standards, by requiring states to obtain thorough and
updated beneficial ownership information for the corporations
formed under its laws. 96 Also, the ITLEA would ensure that the
United States met its international commitment to foreign
nationals. 97 The guidelines of the ITLEA, as opposed to the NASS
proposals and the meager efforts by the states, thoroughly address
provisions that remedy the beneficial ownership transparency
problem in the United States. Without the ITLEA, there is no
indication that any concrete remedial actions will be presented in
the near future to alleviate these issues.
C. Shell Corporations:The Straw That Broke the Camel's Back
Beneficial owner disclosure issues are particularly prevalent
in the formation of shell corporations. 98 Since shell companies

and NASS proposed model law titled the Uniform Law Enforcement Access to
Entity Information Act (the "Uniform Act"). Id. This act deals with two
principle issues: first, a "provision that prohibits all filing entities from
issuing certificates of bearer shares[,]" and second, law enforcement's access
"to ownership and control information about filing entities."
Harry J.
Haynsworth, DRAFTING COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM LAw ENFORCEMENT ACCESS
TO ENTITY INFORMATION ACT UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, CHAIR, TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS ON THE INCORPORATION TRANSPARENCY AND LAW

ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ACT 5 (June 18, 2009), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/publiclindex.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hear
ingjD=eflOel25-2cld-4344-bafl-07f6061611cl). However, the Uniform Act,
with minor exceptions, only applies to "filing entities having 50 or fewer
interest holders." Id.
92. Testimony from Elaine F. Marshall,supra note 89, at 3.
93. Id.
94. See generally Testimony from Elaine F. Marshall, supra note 89
(expressing opposition for the ITLEA).
95. Id. at 3.
96. Levin IntroducesBill, supra note 16, at 2.
97. See Byles, supra note 55 (explaining that most offshore jurisdictions
already request beneficial owner information). This includes the Bahamas,
Cayman Islands, Jersey, and the Isle of Man. Id. See also SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE, supra note 5 (noting that all "countries in the
European Union are required to obtain beneficial ownership information for
the corporations they form.").
98. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining that shell
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have become vehicles for money laundering and other financial
crimes, the ITLEA would effectively address this particular
corporate exploitation.
Similar to standard privately held corporations, shell
corporations
are
detrimental
to
effective
government
enforcement. 99 This is principally because shell companies are
easier to establish and operate than privately held corporations
and LLCs, 10 0 which magnify the problems concerning beneficial
ownership. Through the use of shell companies, criminals enjoy
myriads of ways to manipulate United States corporations and
LLCs without a corresponding increase in beneficial ownership
transparency requirements.10 1
The ITLEA, however, would
require all non-publicly traded companies, including shell
companies, to conform to its provisions.10 2 The fact that shell
companies are usually less substantive 103 then regular
corporations and LLCs would not make a difference under the
ITLEA. Thus, law enforcement agencies would have greater
access to readily available and accurate owner information to
facilitate their investigations of shell corporation abuse.
In addition, blatant ownership deceptiveness is facilitated by
states allowing advertisements on the ease of setting up a shell
corporation within its borders.1 04
In some instances, shell
companies can purchase "corporate office service packages," which
are provided solely to create the impression of a more established
local presence in a particular area.10 5 To add insult to injury, in
order to preserve a client's anonymity, some formation agents even
promote and offer a variety of services that allow for absolutely no
corporations refer to non-publicly traded corporations, LLCs, and trusts that
have no physical presence or major assets).
99. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (noting examples where a
lack of thorough beneficial ownership requirements has resulted in criminals
earning millions of dollars at the expense of the United States).
100. Shell Company Article, supra note 19.
101. Id.
102. S. 569, § 2(11).
103. See Shell Company Article, supra note 19 (explaining that shell
companies typically have no physical presence and usually do not gross
substantial independent revenue).
104. See FINCEN REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-6 (indicating that service
providers advertise services for shell companies through resident-agent and
mail-forwarding services); see also Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 4
(identifying one such state advertisement: "DELAWARE - An Offshore Tax
Haven for Non US Residents"). The advertisement goes on to say that
"[o]wners' names are not disclosed to the state." Id.
105. See FINCEN REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-6 (detailing what these
packages include). Corporate office service packages often contain "a state
business license, a local street address and an office that is staffed during

business hours, a local telephone listing with a live receptionist, and 24-hour
personalized voicemail"). These packages range in price from $900 to $1,950

per year. Id.
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identity disclosure.106
These problems are compounded by states permitting
corporations, general partnerships, trusts, and other business
entities to own and manage other shell companies under the
current disclosure requirements. 107 When another entity is the
beneficial owner, it enables the owning entity to further conceal its
involvement in the activities of the shell company.10 8 Currently,
the layers of ownership that can be created by a shell company
make it highly unlikely that the relationships between various
individuals and companies can be discerned, even if one or more of
the owners are actually discovered. 109
Despite the schemes used by states to entice a shell
corporation to form within its borders, the ITLEA would apply the
same standard of disclosure. 110 This would have the positive effect
of assuring that shell corporations have legitimate presence,
operation, and disclosure, while still allowing states to compete for
a company's business. Further, this eases critics' perception that
states will be negatively affected by the ITLEA."' Moreover, the
ITLEA would make it impossible for criminals to hide behind shell
corporations to create unnecessary layers of owner identity. Thus,
the ITLEA has the ability to create a far reaching remedy that
specifically addresses the deficiencies that have beset corporation
106. See id. at 6 (explaining that these service providers facilitate and
promote beneficial anonymity). Providers set up offices for the shell company,

which are used to eliminate the owner's name from state records. Id. Also, an
owner of a shell company can "retain ownership and operational control
through confidential stock ownership or appointment to [key] offices," such as
vice president, that do not appear on public records. Id. In addition, the
beneficial owner may use "nominee stockholders to create an additional layer
of privacy while maintaining control through an irrevocable proxy agent." Id.
See also Shell Company Article, supra note 19 (reiterating that these features,
while currently legal, may be attractive to criminals to launder funds or
finance terrorism).
107. FINCEN REPORT, supranote 2, at 10.
108. Id.
109. See id. (explaining that in Delaware, for example, an LLC serving as a
beneficial owner or manager for another LLC is not considered to be doing
business in the state just because of being an owner or manager of the other
LLC).
110. See S. 569, § 3 (stating that the ITLEA would amend the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, which applies equally to all states).
111. See Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 6 (clarifying that the ITLEA
would not withhold funds from a state for failing to modify its incorporation
practice obligation under the ITLEA). This is an area that needs to be
developed and specifically addressed within the ITLEA itself since states are
especially concerned that requiring more information will dissuade companies
from incorporating within states with higher disclosure requirements. Derek
Rowley, The Incorporation Transparency & Law Enforcement Assistance Act:
"They Are from the Government, and They Say They Are Here to Help," NEV.
REGISTERED
AGENT
ASS'N.
(2008),
available at http://www.nraa.
biz/incorporation-transparency-law-enforcement-assistance-act.aspx.

1068

The John MarshallLaw Review

[42:1049

and LLC ownership transparency in the past.
V. BUILDING IT TO LAST

The ITLEA provides a strong foundation for the United States
to address its current problem of beneficial ownership
transparency. It introduces key provisions and regulations that
have the ability to prevent criminals from utilizing corporations
and LLCs illegally. 112 The ITLEA, however, is not perfect;
additions to the ITLEA itself and supplemental legislation are
needed. Therefore, this Comment proposes that Congress pass
and sign into law a form of the current ITLEA. The concept of
increased beneficial ownership transparency and reporting is
remarkable in thought but would be extremely difficult and
problematic to implement in practice with the current
interpretation of the ITLEA.
A. Details, Details, Details
The enactment of the ITLEA would finally bring the United
States into compliance with FATF standards. 113 Although the
ITLEA is in line with current international regulations concerning
beneficial ownership transparency,"14 the Act still requires more
detail that clearly and pointedly addresses its reach to the
individual states, and how the states can conform to the ITLEA
without
significant
financial or organizational
burdens.
Accomplishing this would effectively address critics concerns that
the ITLEA is deficient and overbroad, while simultaneously
gaining increased public support for the ITLEA by making its
goals appreciably attainable. 1' 5
Also, the ITLEA needs to reinforce the notion that its passage

112. S. 569, § 3.
113. Levin IntroducesBill, supra note 16, at 2.
114. See Byles, supra note 55 (noting that the Cayman Islands Financial
Services Association ("CIFSA"), for example, is encouraging the United States
to enact the ITLEA, which would require companies to "supply information
along the same high standards which have been implemented in the Cayman
Islands for years.").
Surprisingly, the Cayman Islands already "directly
regulates all service providers who are responsible for incorporating
companies" and make such companies subject to onsite inspections by the
Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (CIMA). Id. This onsite verification is
an example of the detail and follow-through needed to make the ITLEA

effective.
115. See also Doug Batey, Big Brother Wants to Crack Open Your LLC, LLC
LAW MONITOR (2009), available at http://www.llclawmonitor.com/tags/
incorporation-transparency-and/ (claiming that the ITLEA has "many things

wrong with it" and that its definition of a beneficial owner is "breathtakingly
broad"); see generally Testimony from Elaine F. Marshall, supra note 89
(expressing concerns that the proposed legislation financially burdens state
governments).
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would positively level the playing field for all states to form
corporations and LLCs within its borders. No particular state
would be favored over another. 116 This reinforcement is needed
because there is criticism that more ownership disclosure will
make potential corporations and LLCs decide not to incorporate in
a particular state. 117 Without uniformity across the nation, state
revenue may decrease or cause foreign companies to move their
businesses to another country entirely. The ITLEA would not
favor certain states; however, the Act fails to specifically and
18
thoroughly articulate that."
B. Rewarding Good Behavior
To promote compliance, a provision should be added to the
ITLEA that rewards states for effectively disclosing beneficial
ownership information. These "rewards" should be in the form of
tax incentives or increased funding for state sponsored projects
and initiatives. Currently, the ITLEA only provides punishment
provisions for non-compliant beneficial owners. 119 Although these
punishments could be somewhat effective in enforcing compliance;
punishment will not effectively stimulate states to take an active
role in complying with the ITLEA. Instead, states would criticize
rather than support the ITLEA because of the punishment. The
"rewards" provision, on the other hand, would give skeptical states
the incentive to comply. The ITLEA, a nationwide act, would have
a local impact by allowing states to use rewards to respond to
individual state needs, ranging from the construction of public
venues, to increasing the funding for public schools. Further, with
the turbulent state of the economy and unpredictable financial

116. See generally S. 569, § 3 (outlining the minimum incorporation system a
state must implement).
117. See TransparencyBill, supra note 76 (arguing that the ITLEA is a huge
impediment to new business); see also Rowley, supra note 111 (arguing that
no state that seeks to build its economy is going to volunteer to impose higher
reporting and disclosure requirements than is necessary so as to not deter
potential businesses from incorporating within its borders).
118. FINCEN REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. The ITLEA should explicitly
highlight that the average increase in new companies being formed from 2001
to 2005 in the states with the least transparency requirements was 120.09%,
compared to states that require the greatest level of transparency during that
time of 138.75%. Id. The ITLEA needs to detail in its first section that the
vulnerabilities experienced by states that require less disclosure could be
eliminated by requiring higher levels of disclosure for all states, which would
not result in a major adverse effect on the revenue generated by those states.
Each state would thus be more prone to comply with, rather than criticize, the

ITLEA.
119. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(b) (penalizing beneficial owners up to 10,000 dollars
for knowingly providing false ownership information); see also Senator Levin
Statement, supra note 24 (emphasizing that criminal penalties can be imposed
in addition to civil penalties for intentionally providing false information).
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markets, a rewards provision would significantly encourage states
to comply with the ITLEA.
C. InternationalFlexibility
A more elaborate and flexible provision should be required for
the beneficial owners of foreign corporations and LLCs to ensure
the ITLEA's compatibility with foreign corporations. The current
ITLEA requirements would not pose a problem for European
nations already subject to laws requiring strict scrutiny of
beneficial ownership disclosure.120
The ITLEA's
strict
requirements, however, may cause compliance difficulties for
potential foreign corporations that are not required to disclosure
beneficial ownership information in their own countries.
The ITLEA's current requirements would make it very
difficult, if not impossible, for foreign owners who have never had
to disclose ownership in the past to incorporate in the United
States as they may not be able to conform to the requirements. 121
In response, the ITLEA should specifically outline a method to
accommodate foreign corporations that have never been required
to provide ownership disclosure. Flexible requirements should be
implemented to uniquely fit the foreign corporation's situation,
giving it the greatest opportunity to incorporate in the United
States. Additionally, the ITLEA should require more frequent
checks on corporations and LLCs to deter illegitimate activities. 122
This combination would entice foreign entities to establish
120. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE, supra note 5 (noting
that the European Union already has beneficial ownership disclosure
requirements similar to the ITLEA); see also S. 569, § 2(10) (distinguishing the
United States' practices from all countries in the European Union that already
require corporations and LLCs to identify its owners); Byles, supra note 55
(recognizing that most offshore jurisdictions already request this information).
121. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(2) (stating that a foreign beneficial owner
applications must include a written certification by a formation agent residing
in the state); see also Baker, supra note 13 (articulating that the ITLEA
requires corporations and LLCs with non-United States beneficial owners to
provide certification from an in-state formation agent stating he/she has
verified the identity of those owners).
Verification entails including the
owner's name, address, and copy of the owner's picture on his/her United
States passport. S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(2). Requiring a foreign individual to
provide a picture of identification, specifically from his/her United States
passport, can deter many legitimate businesses from incorporating in the
United States since many owners may not, or simply cannot, acquire one.
122. See S. 569, § 3(a)(1)(a)(1)(B) (stating that the ITLEA requires that both
foreign and domestic beneficial information be updated in an annual filing
with the state, or if no such filing is required, each time a change is made in
the beneficial ownership of the company). For the ITLEA to be truly effective,
it needs to provide for more updated surveillance of foreign-owned companies;
one possible solution is mirroring the CIFSA's practices and subjecting all
privately owned companies to random on-site visits to verify that ownership
information is updated. Byles, supra note 55.
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businesses in the United States, while simultaneously protecting
the United States and its consumers from criminal activity. Thus,
a more flexible approach to foreign incorporation would likely have
the positive effect of stimulating international business and
increasing corporate confidence.
D.

Additional Help

The United States would need to go beyond the current
context of the ITLEA and take further action to stop the abuse of
the lack of beneficial ownership transparency for corporations and
LLCs. A supplemental rule should be introduced prohibiting
states from actively advertising the low levels of transparency
requirements, or other formation characteristics that appeal to
criminals, with the intent to entice potential companies to
incorporate within a particular state's borders. 123 The United
States cannot solely rely on the current articulation of the ITLEA
to fix its corporation and LLC ownership disclosure problems
because states are actively highlighting these problems to
124
encourage companies to form in their states.
VI. CONCLUSION

The ITLEA would ensure that persons who form corporations
in the United States disclose the beneficial owners of their
companies.
This disclosure would work to directly prevent
exploitation of the United States as a whole and its citizens
individually. 125 The ITLEA would deter current problems in
corporate ownership disclosure that have forced law enforcement
agencies to cease their investigations because of the impossibility
of acquiring essential ownership information. 126 The significant
ease with which one can create and operate corporations and LLCs
in the United States has been a primary concern because these
127
companies have been used to conduct illegal activities.
123. See S. 569, § 2 (warning that "dozens" of internet websites advertise the
anonymity of beneficial owners requirements under the states' incorporation
practices; some states point to these requirements as a reason to incorporate
within their borders). Some websites go so far as listing states together with
offshore jurisdictions as preferred locations for corporations and LLCs,
essentially providing easy access for criminals to research the ideal place to
form their illegal entities in, or outside of, the United States. S. 569, § 2;
Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 4.
124. S. 569 § 2; Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 4.
125. S. 569; Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16, at 1; Baker, supra note 13;
Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24.
126. Registered Agents, supra note 21; SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

ARTICLE, supra note 5.
127. S. 569; Registered Agents, supra note 21; SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS ARTICLE, supra note 5; Levin Introduces Bill, supra note 16,
at 1; Baker, supra note 13; Senator Levin Statement, supra note 24.
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While the ITLEA should be passed by Congress, provisions
need to be modified. The states need to be assured that the ITLEA
will have a positive effect on the nation and give added incentives
for complying through an additional "rewards provision." Also, the
ITLEA should be amended to specifically detail how it would
require ownership information from foreign corporations that are
not familiar with corporate ownership disclosure, allowing them
the opportunity to compete in the United States. Lastly, a
requirement needs to be added that prohibits states from
highlighting the loopholes in beneficial ownership requirements
through advertisements of nondisclosure.
The ITLEA is a significant piece of legislation that, just like a
simple driver's license, serves a function in our domestic and
global structure. The United States cannot afford to be victimized
by illicit activity because of its reliance on overbroad or
inapplicable disclosure rules.
With the tumultuous and
unpredictable trend in the economy, similar to the unpredictable
DMV, the ITLEA with a few amendments would help bring
stability and confidence to corporate America. Thus, the ITLEA
acts as a brick to a wall of reform that is necessary in order for the
United States to remain a world leader.

